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IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a capital case; it is literally a matter of life and death for Azad Abdullah. On 
appeal, Mr. Abdullah is challenging his judgment of conviction and death sentence, as well as 
the district court's order denying him post-conviction relief 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously set forth in 
Mr. Abdullah's Second Revised Appellant-Petitioner's Brief (hereinafter "Appellant's Br."). 
They need not be repeated here, but are incorvorated by reference. (Appellant's Br. 1-5.) 
References to the Respondent's Brief will be cited herein as "Resp. Br." 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Abdullah objects to the State's attempt to dictate which 
issues it believes he should be permitted to raise on appeal by "rephrasing" the issues on appeal 
(Resp. Br. 10-14), a mechanism not recognized by this Court's rules. Presumably, the State did 
not believe its "rephrased" issues warranted a cross-appeal, as none was filed. See Idaho 
Appellate Rule (IAR) l 5(a) (permitting a timely cross-appeal where reversal, vacation or 
modification of a judgment is sought); cf State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho 365, 373 (2004) (finding 
State's request that appellate court affirm conviction and suppression order on different legal 
theory than that relied upon by district court is not a request for affirmative relief and is properly 
brought as an additional issue on appeal rather than a cross-appeal from the order). 
Similarly, it appears the State did not believe its "wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal" 
were compelling enough to comply with IAR 35(b)(4): "In the event the respondent contends 
that the issues presented on appeal listed in the appellant's brief are insufficient, incomplete, or 
1 
raise additional issues for review, the respondent may list additional issues presented on 
appeal .... " (emphasis added); Fisher, 140 Idaho at 373 ("Therefore the State does not seek 
affirmative relief and properly brought the issue as an additional issue on appeal instead of being 
required to cross appeal from the previous district court order."). That the "state wishes to 
rephrase the issues on appeal" is not a contention that the issues presented in Mr. Abdullah's 
Brief "are insufficient, incomplete, or raise additional issues for review[.]" Instead, it is an 
expression of the State's attempt to dictate which issues Mr. Abdullah, the non-prevailing party, 
will be allowed to raise on appeal, and which issues this Court can consider. Mr. Abdullah 
objects to the State's attempts to change the issues on appeal through an unrecognized, improper 
procedure, and urges this Court to simply address the issues Mr. Abdullah has raised on appeal. 
ISSUES 
GUILT PHASE ISSUES ON DIRECT APPEAL 
I. The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated Azad's Fomieenth Amendment 
Rights To Equal Protection And Due Process When It Denied His Repeated Requests For 
Funding For A Defense DNA Expert 
III. The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Abdullah's First 
Degree Murder Conviction 
IV. The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Abdullah's First 
Degree Arson Conviction 
VI. The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Abdullah's Conviction 
Of Felony Injury To A Child 
VII. The District Court Erred In Providing The Jury With A Single Definition Of Willfully 
That Was Wrong With Respect To All Charged Offenses Except Arson, Effectively 
Reducing The State's Burden Of Proving Mr. Abdullah Guilty Of All Elements Of The 
Charged Offenses Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
VIII. The District Court Erred In Admitting Angie's Statements To Her Lawyer And Doctor 
Over Mr. Abdullah's Objection, Where Such Statements Were Irrelevant And 
Constituted Improper Character Evidence That Was More Prejudicial Than Probative 
IX. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Statements Made by 
Mr. Abdullah That Were Irrelevant and Unfairly Prejudicial 
X. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Allow The Jury To Hear 
Evidence Of Angie's Life Insurance Policy Where Mr. Abdullah Was Not A Beneficiary 
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XIV. The District Court's Finding That There Are No Grounds To Challenge The Legality Of 
The Term Of The Grand Jury That Indicted Mr. Abdullah Is Clearly Erroneous And Not 
Supported By The Record 
ISSUES ON POST-CONVfCTION APPEAL 
I. The District Court Erred In Applying An Incorrect Standard To The Prejudice Portion Of 
Mr. Abdullah's Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Denying Mr. Abdullah 
Postconviction Relief 
VIL The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Abdullah's Claim That He Was 
Denied His Sixth Amendment Right To Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Counsels' 
Failure To Investigate, Prepare And Present An Adequate Case [n Mitigation 
XIII. The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Abdullah's Claims That He Was Denied His 
Sixth Amendment Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Counsels' Improper 
Advisements Regarding His Right To Testify At The Guilt And Penalty Phase, And To 
Allocute 
XIV. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Abdullah's Claim That His Sixth Amendment 
Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel Was Violated By Counsels' Failure To 
Conduct Adequate Voir Dire, Failure To Strike Biased Jurors For Cause And Failing To 
Utilize Peremptory Strikes To Remove The Most Biased Jurors 
ARGUMENT 
Direct Appeal Issues 1 
I. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated Mr. Abdullah's Fourteenth 
Amendment Rights To Equal Protection And Due Process When It Denied His Repeated 
Requests For Funding For A Defense DNA Expert 
The district court abused its discretion and violated Mr. Abdullah's Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process rights by denying his repeated and reasonable 
requests to fund a defense DNA expert. Both the district court below and the State on appeal 
seem to believe that in order to receive funding for a DNA expert at trial, a defendant must first 
prove the State's DNA testing is flawed, the results are inculpatory, and the DNA evidence is the 
1Where a reply to specific claims is not necessitated by the Respondent's Brief, Mr. Abdullah 
relies on his prior briefing. For those issues which require a response, for the sake of consistency 
and ease ofreference, Mr. Abdullah relies on the same numbering as in his Appellant's Brief. 
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only evidence linking a defendant to the charged crime(s). (Resp. Br. 1 17.) How a defendant 
can be expected to make these pre-trial showings about scientific evidence without the benefit of 
a DNA expert is unclear. 2 It is the anosognosic's dilemma; how do you know what you do not 
know? 
What we do know is that when the court denied Mr. Abdullah's requests for a DNA 
expert, it knew the State intended to rely upon DNA testing results, and in fact did so at trial, not 
to exculpate Mr. Abdullah, but to inculpate him. If the DNA testing results were so obviously 
exculpatory, as the district court concluded when it denied Mr. Abdullah's request, the results 
could not have figured so prominently in the State's case as they did. (31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.995, 
L.ll -p.108, L.21; Vol .VIII, p.101, L.8 p.102, L.l p.124, L.18--p.125, L.6.) 
Without the assistance of a defense DNA expert to testify at trial or advise the defense 
about DNA testing that could have or should have been done, and to explain the science 
underlying the State expert's interpretation of the DNA test results, the best the defense could do 
was reiterate, through cross-examination of the State's expert, that Mr. Abdullah was excluded as 
a major contributor to the DNA on the cape, but not excluded as a minor contributor. (Id. Vol.VI, 
p.1022, Ls.4-12.) The defense was without adequate information or knowledge of DNA testing 
to challenge the prosecutor's fallacious hypothetical of what the DNA results represented. 
The State's expert testified "[t]he probability of randomly selecting an unrelated 
individual with the DNA profile consistent with the reportable DNA profile from the cape prep 
2 Post-conviction investigation debunked the conclusion of a "match" and confirmed that but for 
the State expert's erroneous interpretation of the DNA results, those results could have been 
deemed exclusionary or exculpatory by a defense expert, not inculpatory. (R.39417, pp. 4526-
4531.) 
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one 1s I in 16,000." (id. Vol. VI, p.101 Ls.8-14.) The prosecutor summarized the expert's 
testimony as "those four markers, the probability of random selection in this most recent 
database covering Middle Eastern populations isl in 16,000[.]" (Id., p.1017, Ls.15-17.) The 
prosecutor then erroneously applied this random match probability to the population of Boise, 
assuming a population of 250,000 people. (Id., p. l 0 17, Ls.19-24.) The prosecutor proposed a 
hypothetical to the State's DNA expert regarding the random match probability, which 
ultimately resulted in the expert agreeing only 10 men, of the 250,000 people in Boise, could be 
possible contributors to the combined, partial DNA profile found at the scene. (Id., p.1016, 
L.24 - p. l 0 18, L. 15.) The hypothetical was erroneous. 
The prosecutor's fallacy is the assumption that the random match 
probability is the same as the probability that the defendant was not the source of 
the DNA sample .... [n other words, if a juror is told the probability a member of 
the general population would share the same DNA is l in 10,000 (ran,dom match 
probability), and he takes that to mean there is only a 1 in 10,000 chance that 
someone other than the defendant is the source of the DNA found at the crime 
scene (source probability), then he has succumbed to the prosecutor's fallacy. It is 
further error to equate source probability with probability of guilt, unless there is 
no explanation other than guilt for a person to be the source of crime-scene DNA. 
This faulty reasoning may result in an erroneous statement that, based on a 
random match probability of 1 in 10,000, there is a .01 % chance the defendant is 
innocent or a 99.99% chance the defendant is guilty. 
McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 128 (2010); United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.2d 1144, 
1157-58 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[S]uppose the FBI's evidence establishes that there is a one in 10,000 
chance of a random match. The jury might equate this likelihood with source probability by 
believing that there is a one in 10,000 chance that the evidentiary sample did not come from the 
defendant. This equation of random match probability with source probability is known as the 
prosecutor's fallacy." (Footnote omitted)). Mr. Abdullah's prosecutor and the State's DNA 
expert both succumbed to the prosecutor's fallacy. The absence of a defense DNA expert 
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allowed this fallacy to uncorrected, and allowed the prosecutor to repeat an incorrect version 
of the original fallacy in closing argument, asserting Mr. Abdullah was the only man, of ten 
possible DNA contributors in the Treasure Valley-with a population of 360,000-who had keys 
to the house, who purchased gas, bought a cape, and was in Mountain Home after midnight. 
(31659 Tr. Vol. VIII, p.101, L.13-p.102, L.17.) 
The standards for funding a defense expert are clear, well-established, and more 
thoroughly set forih in detail in the Appellant's Brief, and need not be repeated here. 
(Appellant's Br. 9-11.) To the extent there is conflict between interpretation of the standards for 
the appointment of a defense expert for an indigent defendant as expressed by this Court in State 
v. Olin, l 03 ldaho 391, 394 ( 1982), and the United States Supreme Court three years later in Ake 
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77-78 (1985), Ake controls. 3 In Ake, the Court identified three factors 
a court must consider when deciding whether the State must provide an indigent defendant with 
competent expert (psychiatric) assistance in preparing his defense: ( l) the private interest 
affected, i.e., the accuracy of the criminal proceeding that puts a person's life or liberty at risk; 
(2) the government's economic interest if the assistance is provided; and (3) the probable value 
of the assistance. Id. at 77-78. The Supreme Court concluded the first factor automatically 
weighs in a defendant's favor, while the third factor must include consideration of the risk of 
error if the assistance is not provided; the Supreme Court held "where the potential accuracy of 
3 Ake was issued three years after Olin. Both opinions address the standards for providing expert 
assistance to an indigent defendant under federal Due Process and Equal Protection standards. 
The United States Constitution sets the constitutional floor for minimal protections afforded to 
citizens, not the ceiling. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). While states may rely on 
their own constitutions to provide the same or greater protections to their citizens than is 
afforded under the federal constitution, they cannot provide less protection. Id.; State v. Donato, 
135 Idaho 469,471 (2000). Thus, Ake controls the analysis, not Olin. 
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the jury's determination is so dramatically enhanced, and where the interests of the individual 
and the State in an accurate proceeding are substantial, the State's interest in its fisc must yield." 
Id. at 78-79, 82-83 (footnote omitted). 
Trial counsel supported their request for a defense DNA expert by attaching the State's 
DNA expert report and explaining the expert's analysis would be used by the State to establish 
Mr. Abdullah's presence at the scene the morning of Angie's death and the fire. (31659 Def's Ex 
Parte Mot. to Supp. Application for Costs of Investigative and Expert Witnesses, pp.4-5.) Trial 
counsel explained a defense DNA expert would be necessary to discredit and/or explain the 
conclusions reached by State DNA experts who tested the gas can and cape, and to advise the 
defense regarding the need for additional testing of the bag allegedly found over Angie's head. 
(Id.) Of course, a substantial issue in Mr. Abdullah's case was whether he was at the scene the 
morning of Angie's death and the fire, or if he was in Salt Lake City. Given that, the probable 
value of the assistance of a defense DNA expert to challenge the State's DNA expert's 
conclusions that Mr. Abdullah could not be excluded as a minor contributor to the DNA on the 
cape and gas can at the scene, thus refuting his presence at the scene, was extraordinary. 
The district court abused its discretion in refusing Mr. Abdullah's repeated requests to 
fund a defense DNA expert. The court did not reach its decisions denying access to a DNA 
expert by application of established legal standards, and did not reach its decisions through an 
exercise of reason. The court simply found that because Mr. Abdullah did not contend the State's 
testing was flawed, the results tainted, or the evidence mishandled by the State's chosen lab (not 
the Idaho State Crime Lab), he did not establish a DNA expert was necessary to his defense. 
Moreover, the court ordered Mr. Abdullah to direct his requests for DNA testing of any other 
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evidence to the State; the court's order filtering Mr. Abdullah's testing requests through the State 
would have compelled defense counsel to disclose work product and trial strategy to 
Mr. Abdullah's pr<?secutors, in order to secure DNA testing and assistance. Conditioning a 
defendant's right to obtain expert assistance on the disclosure of work product and trial strategy 
to the very entity seeking not just to convict the defendant, but kill !um, is outrageous. 
A defense DNA expert could have consulted with defense, helped the defense understand 
the DNA evidence, identified shortcomings in the State expert's report and testing procedures, 
recommended additional or different testing, helped the defense prepare for cross-examination of 
the State's DNA expert, and testified on behalf of Mr. Abdullah. See cl Ake, 470 U.S. at 81. As 
the United States Supreme Court has recognized in finding the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation extends to analysts who conduct forensic testing: 
Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation. 
According to a recent study conducted under the auspices of the National 
Academy of Sciences, "[t]he majority of [laboratories producing forensic 
evidence] are administered by law enforcement agencies, such as police 
departments, where the laboratory administrator reports to the head of the 
agency." National Research Council of the National Academies, Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward &--1 (Prepublication Copy 
Feb. 2009) (hereinafter National Academy Report). And "[b ]ecause forensic 
scientists often are driven in their work by a need to answer a particular question 
related to the issues of a particular case, they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice 
appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency." Id., at S-17. A forensic 
analyst responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel 
pressure-or have an incentive-to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the 
prosecution. 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009) (footnote omitted).4 
4 The constitutional right to cross-examine experts and forensic analysts about the results of their 
testing is meaningless if counsel knows nothing of the scientific subject matter and has no idea 
how to determine whether the analyst's results are fraudulent, incompetent or deficient. 
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Clearly, the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Abdullah's request for 
funds to retain a defense DNA expert by applying improper standards and improperly burdening 
Mr. Abdullah with waiver of important protections in order to obtain testing to which he had 
shown he was entitled. Mr. Abdullah was prejudiced by the absence of a defense DNA expert, 
which allowed unreliable State expert's testimony regarding the value of the DNA evidence in 
his case to go unchallenged through cross-examination, and similarly permitted the prosecutor to 
engage in fallacious arguments about the likelihood of someone other than Mr. Abdullah being a 
contributor to the mixed DNA samples. The State cannot show this error in depriving Mr. 
Abdullah of a DNA expert was harmless. 
III. 
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Abdullah's First Degree 
Murder Conviction 
The evidence presented by the State was insufficient to support Mr. Abdullah's first 
degree murder conviction. While the State attempts to frame its experts' trial testimony in a 
different light on appeal, the experts' testimony before the jury was very clear: Angie ingested a 
potentially lethal dose of Prozac between 10 p.m. and midnight on October 4, 2002, which 
incapacitated her and contributed to her death. (31659 Tr. Vol .VI, p.457, L.19 - p.458, L.13, 
p.480, Ls.13-22, p.551, L.16 - p.552, L.10, p.852, L.7 - p.853, L.6, p.864, L.18 - p.865, L.15, 
p.866, L.4-7.) The State claims it was the absence of gelatinous material in Angie's stomach 
contents from the volume of pills necessary to reach the potentially lethal level of Prozac Angie 
had in her system at the time of her death, which led the State's experts to opine Angie ingested 
Prozac between 10 p.m. and midnight. (Resp. Br. 27-28.) However, other State experts testified 
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Angie could have ingested the Prozac pills (between 40 and 100 bitter pills )5 dissolved in liquid, 
and as a result, the State argues if Angie ingested the pills dissolved in liquid she could have 
done so long after IO p.m. or midnight. (Id.) The State's argument on appeal mischaracterizes the 
trial testimony of its own experts and lay witnesses. 
It was a combination of testimony from Angie's family members about their activities the 
night of October 4, Angie's stomach contents, the nominal amount of Prozac and Prozac 
metabolite in Angie's system, and the absence of any gelatinous pill material in her stomach 
contents, which collectively led to the conclusions of the State's experts that Angie ingested the 
potentially lethal amount of Prozac before she consumed her last meal. (See 31659 Tr. Vol. IV, 
p.51, L.23 ·· p.60, L.16 (A.H. testifying she, Angie, S.S., M.A. and N.A. got home from her Aunt 
Charlene's about l0:30 p.m., and she and S.S. watched a movie with Angie, who was holding 
M.A., and after it was over, Angie and M.A. went to bed); Vol. IV, p.97, L.24 - p. l 15, L.12 (S.S. 
testifying she and A.H. went to bed about midnight but Angie was still up, and was in the kitchen 
when S.S. last saw her); Vol. VL p.582, L. 1 - p.583, L.25 (Angie's Aunt Charlene testifying 
Angie and the kids were at her home the night of October 4th and left at about 9:00 or 9:30 p.m.; 
Charlene did not observe anything unusual about Angie or her behavior); Vol. VI, p.551, L.19 -
p.553, L.9 (Dr. Backer, State's expert, testifying Prozac had to be ingested by Angie before her 
last meal, based on the absence of Prozac or its metabolite in Angie's stomach contents); 
Vol. VI, p.547, L.3 - p. 548, L.2 (Dr. Backer testifying Angie's ingestion of Prozac was acute, 
based on the skewed ratio between the Prozac and its metabolite found in her system); Vol. VI, 
5The State's expert, Dr. Backer, testified a person would need to take at least 40 to 50 Prozac 
tablets (40 milligram), and up to 100 tablets, to reach the concentration levels found in Angie's 
system. (31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.548, L.16 - p.549, L.5, p.566, L.20 - p.567, L. 10.) 
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p.475, L. l - p.476, L.5, p.489, 12 (Dr. Graben agreeing the absence of metabolite in 
Angie's blood indicated an acute increase in Prozac and then death, which prevented 
metabolism, and cause of Angie's death was "the potentially lethal Fluoxetine in conjunction 
with the asphyxiation by plastic bag."); Vol. VI, p.457, L.19 - p.460, L.2 (Dr. Graben testifying 
Angie's stomach contents revealed a full stomach, with no pill particles or substances, and 
stomach contents had to be from a meal consumed after 7:00 p.m. on October 4, 2002); Vol. VI, 
p.825, L. 18 - p.836, L.17 (Dr. Barbieri, State's pharmacology expert, testifying Angie would 
have shown toxic effects and signs--such as nausea and vomiting--if she ingested Prozac before 
9:30 p.m. and because she did not, ingestion had to happen after that); Vol. VI, p.864, L.25 -
p.865, L. 15 (Dr. Barbieri testifying stomach emptying time is 1 ½ hours; because Angie's 
stomach was full when she died, and the contents only partially digested, she would have 
consumed her last meal 1 ½ hours before her death; given the small amount of Prozac in her 
stomach, she had to have consumed the Prozac before the meal, not with it or after it). 
In light of all the other evidence relating to Angie's behavior and demeanor that night, 
which included an absence of vomiting and nausea and other outward exhibitions of toxicity 
Angie would have manifested, the State experts reached the conclusion that Angie ingested the 
Prozac in some form, liquid or otherwise, before her last meal, between 10 p.m. and midnight. 
(Id. Vol. VI, p.866, Ls.4-7.) 
Unlike in State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 713-15 (2009), where the indictment alleged 
and the State presented evidence at trial the victim died as a result of a drug overdose, or 
suffocation, or a combination of both, in Mr. Abdullah's case, the State presented evidence that a 
potentially lethal dose of Prozac, which would have incapacitated Angie, was a condition 
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precedent to her being suffocated with a bag over her head. Specifically, the State relied upon 
Angie's incapacitated condition to explain why, after two autopsies, the State could find no 
brnises or injuries consistent with defensive wounds, which Dr. Groben testified would be 
present had Angie died from suffocation alone. (31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.462 Ls.3-22, p.465, L.6 -
p.466, L.9.) As a result, to prove Mr. Abclullah's gmlt of first degree murder, the State had to 
prove his connection to Angie's ingestion of the Prozac, in addition to asphyxiation. (31659 
Tr. VIII, p.177, Ls.11-13 (prosecutor concluding in closing argument: "She died because she was 
debilitated and a plastic bag was put over her head and her oxygen supply was cut off."); 
Vol. VI, p.870, L.3 - p.871, L.2 (Dr. Barbieri testifying to a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty that Prozac was a contributory factor in Angie's death, and could have debilitated her, 
caused her to have seizures, and caused her to go into a coma).) 
In contrast, in Severson, the victim's cause of death was listed as undetermined because 
the evidence supported either suffocation or overdose, and the victim could have died from 
either one of these two possible causes, ·with one cause not being necessary to the other. 147 
Idaho at 7 l3. The victim in Severson had a lethal level of Unisom in her system, a toxic level of 
Ambien, but also had bruising and abrasions on her face and cuts inside her lips, indicative of 
suffocation Id. This Court observed substantial trial evidence linked the defendant to the victim's 
murder, including: motive; that he was preparing other people for the victim's death; he recently 
tried to poison the victim; he tried to conceal the circumstances of the victim's death; and he had 
the opportunity and means to kill her Id. Most notably, the State presented direct evidence 
linking the defendant to the Ambien and Unisom, including proof the defendant requested and 
picked up the victim's Ambien prescription the day before her death and had a baggie of Unisom 
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pills hidden in the brim of a hat with "clad" printed on it. Id. at 715. Aside from being husband 
and wife and sharing the same home, same bed, and same insurance, there was no evidence 
presented linking Mr. Abdullah to Angie's Prozac. 
On appeal, the State does not attempt to explain or cite to any evidence supporting a 
connection between Mr. Abdullah and the Prozac, and no evidence presented at trial linked 
Mr. Abdullah to the Prozac or Angie's ingestion of it. Because Angie's involuntary ingestion of 
Prozac was integral to the State's case for first degree murder, the State had to present evidence 
linking Mr. Abdullah to the Prozac. None of the State's evidence links Mr. Abdullah to the 
Prozac, and none of the evidence puts Mr. Abdullah in Boise at or near the time Angie ingested 
the Prozac. In fact, the State's own experts place Angie's ingestion of Prozac at a time 
Mr. Abdullah was not even physically present in Boise, let alone in Angie's presence. Where 
Angie's incapacitation from a potentially lethal amount of Prozac was necessa,y to prove 
Mr. Abdullah suffocated Angie with a bag after she was incapacitated, thus explaining the 
complete absence of any wounds or injuries that would have been present if Angie had been 
awake or conscious at the time of suffocation, the absence of such evidence renders the evidence 
insufiicient to support Mr. Abdullah's first degree murder conviction. 
IV. 
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Abdullah's First Degree 
Arson Conviction 
The State's evidence of first degree arson, when viewed in the light most favorable to it 
and the jury verdict, shows only that Mr. Abdullah attempted to willfully and unlawfully damage 
a dwelling by fire or explosion. The State's experts testified the vapors from the gasoline in the 
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garage were prematurely and accidentally ignited by a pilot light on the water heater, not 
intentionally ignited by the person who poured the gas. 
Mr. Abdullah maintains that even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State, because he did not provide an ignition source for the gas vapors, he can only be held 
responsible for acts he actually committed, which constitute the crime of attempted arson, not the 
completed crime of arson. The State seems to argue that pouring gas was more than mere 
preparation for arson, and as a result, the pouring of the gas alone is arson. (Resp. Br. 34-37.) 
That's like saying a defendant who intentionally stabs a victim in the chest is guilty of first 
degree murder, even though the victim survives the stabbing, because the stabbing was more 
than "mere preparation" for first degree murder. 
Indeed, later in its briefing the State concedes that "but for the intervening spark caused 
by the pilot light, nothing more was required than 'lighting the match' to complete Abdullah's 
intended goal." (Resp. Br. 36.) The State's acknowledgement that arson requires more than 
pouring gas leads to its next argument that because it was completely foreseeable and expected 
for the water heater pilot light to ignite the gas fumes in the garage, the accidental ignition does 
not "absolve [Mr. Abdullah] of criminal liability under I.C. section 18-802." (Id.) That the 
accidental ignition was foreseeable, expected or intended, is contradicted by the State's experts, 
all of whom testified the ignition of the gas fumes in the garage by the water heater pilot light 
was accidental and unexpected by whoever poured the gas. (31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.199, L.20 -
p.201, L.16, p.208, Ls.2-15, p.234, L.5 - p.235, L.2.) None of the evidence presented at trial 
supports the State's claim on appeal that the accidental ignition was foreseeable and expected. 
Moreover, no one has ever claimed the accidental ignition of the gas fumes would absolve 
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Mr. Abdullah of all criminal liability. While the accidental ignition absolves Mr. Abdullah of 
criminal liability for the completed act of first degree arson, it does not absolve him of liability 
for the inchoate crime of attempted first degree arson. Up until the time the fumes or vapors were 
ignited, there was time to withdraw and not complete the arson; we do not know what would 
have happened if the pilot light had not prematurely ignited the gas fumes in the garage that 
morning. Where the ignition happened by accident and without Mr. Abdullah's involvement or 
knowledge or expectation, he can only be held responsible for his voluntary and intentional acts 
which, based on the evidence presented at trial, qualify as attempted first degree arson, not arson. 
VI. 
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Abdullah's Conviction Of 
Felony Injury To A Child 
This issue was thoroughly briefed and suppmt by relevant, controlling law, and amply 
supported by extens1 ve citation to the record and transcript, including pinpoint citations to 
relevant testimony by page and line numbers. 6 It bears repeating that the State presented no 
evidence Mr. Abdullah committed an injury on N.A.; N.A. was found in the backyard of the 
home by firefighters, where he could not have been longer than a few moments. N.A. was calm, 
he was neither injured nor harmed, and was sitting on a comforter surrounded by toys and stuffed 
animals. (31659 Tr. Vol. IV, p.365, L.22 - p.371, L.24.) There is no evidence Mr. Abdullah 
intended to harm N.A., that he intended to place N.A. in harm's way, or that he knew he was 
placing N .A. in a situation that would endanger N .A.' s person or health, given the presence of 
firefighters and neighbors walking through the yard where N.A. was found. 
6The State provides no citations to relevant lines of transcript testimony, but instead cites pages 
and page ranges, leaving it to undersigned counsel and this Court to locate testimony the State 
presumably is relying on to support its arguments. 
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In addition, at the time of Mr. Abdullah' s offense and conviction, the willfulness element 
of injury to a child was not satisfied by a person acting, or failing to act, "where a reasonable 
person would know the act or failure to act is likely to result in injury or harm or is likely to 
endanger the person, health, safety or well-being of the child." LC. § 18-150 l (I) (2005). This 
definition of willful was not added to the statute until 2005, and thus could not be applied to 
Mr. Abdullah's case. The only definition of willful provided to Mr. Abdullah's jury was the 
definition under section 18-101, which this Comt previously acknowledged could not support a 
conviction for felony injmy to a child. State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 373 (2002). Applying the 
correct statute and c01Tect definition of willful, there was insufficient evidence presented to 
support Mr. Abdullah's conviction for felony injury to a child. The State's arguments merit no 
additional response. 
VII. 
The District Comt Erred In Providing The Jury With A Single Definition Of Willful That Was 
Wrong With Respect To All Charged Offenses Except Arson, Effectively Reducing The State's 
Burden Of Proving Mr. Abdullah Guilty Of All Elements Of The Charged Offenses Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt 
The instructions provided to Mr. Abdullah's jury reduced the State's burden of proving 
every element of each charged offense by providing a single definition of willful that was wrong 
for every charged offense, except arson. Such error violated Mr. Abdullah's due process rights 
and was not harmless because it permitted the jury to convict him under incorrect legal theories, 
with less than sufficient evidence, and had substantial and injurious effect or influence on the 
jury's verdicts. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 58 (2008); State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 
(2011 ). The willfulness of each charged offense was contested, and there was not overwhelming 
evidence of willfulness for each offense. Draper, 151 Idaho at 588. 
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Because trial counsel did not object to the willful instruction, the instruction must be 
reviewed as fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 223 (2010). An error is 
fundamental if a defendant shows: (1) the error violates one or more of his unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) it plainly exists on the appellate record; and (3) was not harmless. Id. at 
228. An instruction that omits an element of the offense, or relieves the State of its burden of 
proving every element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, violates due process. 
Middleton v. AfcNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588. Even without an 
objection by counsel, if a jury reaches its verdict based on erroneous jury instructions which 
vitiate all of the jury's findings, the appellate court will not engage in harmless error analysis, 
and instead will vacate and remand the case for a new trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 
1 (1993 ); Perry, l 50 Idaho at 
Mr. Abdullah's jury was told that willful meant something less than intentional, and 
required no intent to harm or cause injury. (31659 Tr. Vol. VIII, p.189, L.8 - p.191, L.15; 
31659 Supp. R., pp.69-70.) Specifically, Mr. Abdullah's jurors were told "an act is willful or 
done willfully when done on purpose. One can act willfully without intending to violate the law 
to injure another or to acquire any advantage." (31659 Tr. Vol. VIII, p.191, Ls.9-13 ( emphasis 
added).) Armed with this definition of willful, Mr. Abdullah's jury retired to determine whether 
he was guilty of all six charged offenses, each of which except arson required a specific intent to 
injure another person. 7 It must be presumed the jury followed the instructions, considered them 
7Notably, had Mr. Abdullah been properly charged with attempted arson, this definition of 
willful would have been wrong for attempted arson as well. See, e.g., State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 
294, 300 (2000) ("However, as pointed out in Pratt the crime of attempt does require a specific 
showing of intent to commit the underlying crime."). 
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as a whole, and gave no consideration to the order in which the instructions were provided. 
(R. 31659, J.I.4.) 
The State claims the presumption that jurors followed the instructions does not apply here 
where the jury asked for the definition of willful with respect to the elements instruction for 
arson, and as a result, would have only applied the willful definition to arson. (Resp. Br. 44.) 
Arguably, the State's position would have some merit if the district court had told jurors the 
definition of willful applied only to arson. But instead, without caveat or qualification, the 
district court responded to the jury question by telling them "an act is willful or done willfully 
when done on purpose. One can act willfully without intending to violate the law to injure 
another or to acquire any advantage." (31659 Tr. Vol. VlII, p.191, Ls.9-13; 31659 Supp. R., 
p.70.) Nothing about the court's definition of willful limits its application to arson. Such a 
limitation was particularly important in this case where willful was an element of every crime 
charged in the indictment, but arson was the only charged offense for which this reduced mens 
rea of willful applied. The definition of willful provided to the jury was wrong for every offense 
except arson, it relieved the State of its burden to prove intent for every charged offense, and 
violated Mr. Abdullah's due process rights. 
The first degree murder and attempted first degree murder instructions in Mr. Abdullah's 
case, coupled with the erroneous definition of willful, are akin to the erroneous instruction in 
State v. Buckley, 131 Idaho 164 (1998). In Buckley, the defendant shot the victim and was 
charged with attempted first degree murder. 131 Idaho at 164-65. At trial, the defendant was 
found guilty of attempted second degree murder. Id. On appeal, he argued the trial court's failure 
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to include "intent to kill" m the elements instruction for attempted second degree murder was 
error requiring his conviction be vacated. Id. This Court agreed. Id. at l 67. 
In Buckley, the defendant's jury was instructed that to find the defendant guilty of 
attempted second degree murder, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant engaged in conduct that would have caused the death of the victim, that he acted 
without justification or excuse, and with malice aforethought. Id. at 165. This Court deemed the 
elements instmction incoITect because it did not require the jury to find the defendant intended to 
kill the victim. Id. The State argued that the erroneous clements instruction was cured by two 
other instructions, one that defi ncd malice as express or implied according to section 18-4002 of 
Idaho Code, and another that stated "[t]he crime of MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE 
requires the specific intent to kill a human being with malice aforethought." Id. at 165. This 
Court disagreed, concluding: 
In the present case, Instruction No. 18 [the elements instruction] purported to tell 
the jury all the elements of the crime of attempted second degree murder they 
would have to find to convict Buckley of that offense. By leaving out the element 
of the intent to kill, it did not include all the elements of the crime. 
Id. at 166. This Court vacated the defendant's conviction, finding it "impossible to determine 
whether [the defendant] was convicted under the legally valid theory of express malice (intent to 
kill) or the legally invalid theory of implied malice." Id. at 167. 
Here, like the jury in Buckley, Mr. Abdullah's jury was provided with the definition of 
malice for first degree murder and three counts of attempted first degree murder that included 
express malice, which would encompass an intent to kill, and implied malice, which would not. 
Buckley, 131 Idaho at 165; R. 31659 J .I. 15. Mr. Abdullah' s jury was also instructed that to find 
him guilty of first degree murder, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in 
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conduct that caused Angie's death, he acted without justification or excuse, he acted with malice 
aforethought, and the murder was a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. (R. 31659, J.I. 
13, J .I. 16.) Similarly, Mr. Abdullah's jury was instructed that to find him guilty of three counts 
of attempted first degree murder, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt he "did some act 
which was a step toward committing the crime of Murder in the first degree of (A.H., M.A. and 
S.S,] and when doing so [Mr. Abdullah] intended to commit that particular crime." (R. 31659, 
J.I. 21, J.I. 23, J.I. 25.) Mr. Abdullah's jury was then instructed that the crime of murder in the 
first degree of A.H., M.A. and S.S. would be committed if a person engaged in conduct which 
caused the death of A.H., M.A. and acted without justification or excuse, acted with malice 
aforethought, and the murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated. (R. 31659, J.I 22, J .I. 24, 
J.I. 26.) 
Like the jury in Buckley, Mr. Abdullah's jury was provided with a definition for malice 
aforethought that allowed his jury to find him guilty of first degree murder and three counts of 
attempted first degree murder, even if he lacked the intent to kill. As explained above, when 
Mr. Abdullah's jury asked for a definition of willful, it was provided with a definition that did 
not require an intent to hann or injure, let alone an intent to kill. Like the jury in Buckley, it 
cannot be said that Mr. Abdullah's jury did not rely upon the legally invalid theory of implied 
malice to find him guilty of first degree murder and three counts of attempted first degree 
murder. Under these circumstances, where Mr. Abdullah's jury was provided with an implied 
malice instruction and an erroneous definition of willful, neither of which required the jury to 
find Mr. Abdullah had the specific intent to kill Angie, A.H., M.A. or S.S., none of these 
convictions can stand. 
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Thus, where the definition of willful vitiates all of the jury's findings of the willful 
element for every offense except arson, harmless error analysis is improper and Mr. Abdullah's 
convictions must be vacated. 
VIII. 
The District Court Erred In Admitting Angie's Statements To Her Lawyer And Medical 
Providers Over Mr. Abdullah's Objection, Where Such Statements Were Irrelevant And 
Constituted Improper Character Evidence That Was More Prejudicial Than Probative 
Angie's statements to her lawyer and medical providers regarding sterilization, 
Mr. Abdullah's willingness to get a vasectomy, her perspective on the condition of her man-iage 
and divorce, Mr. Abdullah's past infidelity, her suspicions that he had been unfaithful in the 
spring of 2002, and her statements to her lawyer regarding Mr. Abdullah's character, were 
irrelevant. As a result, the district court committed error when it admitted these statements. (See 
Appellant's Br. 39-46.) Because the statements were not relevant to any issue, whether the court 
also abused its discretion in deeming the statements more probative than prejudicial, is a 
question that need not be reached. The court did not identify how Angie's statements made any 
fact of consequence to the charges against Mr. Abdullah more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence, instead holding the statements were either statements for the purposes of 
medical treatment, statements that reflected Angie's state of mind, or, with respect to Angie's 
confidential statements to her lawyer about divorce, were probative of Mr. Abdullah's "potential 
motive." (31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.316, L.12 p.317, L.2, p.318, Ls.1-6, p.319, Ls.16-23, p.362, 
L.25 - p.363, L.5, p.612, Ls.3-10, p.707, L.22 - p.708, L.11, p.709, Ls.4-22; Vol. VII, p.51, L.15 
p.52, L.15.) None of these statements, except those regarding sterilization and Mr. Abdullah's 
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willingness to get a vasectomy, 8 were admitted for their truth; instead, these statements were 
admitted by the district court as statements for the purpose of medical treatment to show Angie's 
"state of mind." (Id. Tr. Vol. VI, p.358, L.7 -p.368, L.7, p.362, L.25 p.363, L.5, p.709, Ls. l 
22.) Notably, the State does not respond to Mr. Abdullah's claims of error with regard to Angie's 
statements to her medical providers, which Mr. Abdullah maintains were iITelevant, but only 
responds to the statements Angie made to her attorney, Deb Kristal. (Resp. Br. 46-51.) 
This Court reviews questions regarding the admissibility of evidence using a 
mixed standard ofreview. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217,221 
(2008). First, whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of law that is subject to 
free review. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569, 165 P.3d 273, 283 (2007). 
Second, we review the district court's determination of whether the probative 
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143, 191 P.3d at 221. We determine whether the district 
court abused its discretion by examining: (1) whether the court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently within the applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Id. However, an abuse of discretion may be deemed hannless if a substantial right 
is not affected. State v. Thornpson, 132 Idaho 628,636, 977 P.2d 890, 898 (1999). 
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363 (2010). 
Statements for the purpose of medical treatment are admissible as hearsay exceptions 
only if they are relevant, i.e., have some connection to a fact of consequences in the case. LR.E. 
401. As reflected by the district court's decisions admitting Angie's statements to her doctor, her 
8Dr. Williams testified regarding the contents of her conversation with Angie about sterilization, 
including: what Dr. Williams told all her patients about the benefits of vasectomies over female 
sterilization (including less invasive procedures and lower costs); that the decision to be 
sterilized was Angie's, not the Abdullahs' as a couple; and, Angie's assertion that Mr. Abdullah 
would not have a vasectomy. (31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.320, L.11 p.322, L.10.) Dr. Williams also 
testified Mr. Abdullah was not present after Angie's sterilization surgery. (Id., p.321, L.14 
p.322, L. l 0.) All of these statements were admitted for their truth, as statements for the purpose 
of medical treatment. 
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nurse practitioner, and her therapist about Mr. Abdullah's past infidelity, sterilization, 
vasectomies, and divorce, the statements were admitted as statements for the purpose of medical 
treatment. The district court also deemed Angie's statements to her nurse practitioner and 
therapist to be relevant to Angie's state of mind, but inadmissible for their truth. 
Not only were the statements to Angie's medical/mental health providers and those to her 
lawyer, Ms. Kristal, irrelevant, but even assuming for the sake of argument the statements were 
relevant and admissible to show Angie's state of mind, the statements were nevertheless 
inadmissible because they failed to reflect Angie had a state of mind inconsistent with a design 
or mtent to take her own life. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 364. A person contemplating divorce is 
not exhibiting a state of mind inconsistent with suicide, but is actually exhibiting a state of mind 
that is consistent with suicide and hopelessness. Angie's statements expressing concerns about 
the couples' finances, Mr. Abdullah's commitment to his faith and reputation in the Muslim 
community, the sale of her house, moving to Saudi Arabia or Africa, his character, his past 
infidelity, her belief he had no driver's license, her prior experience when she left him, the 
impact of a Muslim will for A.H, her daughter, and expressing an interest in creating a formal 
will to cover N.A. and M.A., arc all statements that were not made to Mr. Abdullah, and are 
statements that do not show a state of mind inconsistent with suicide. Instead, they seem to show 
the opposite; they reflect a woman who is exhausted, with few options, and who does not know 
what to do. Moreover, Angie's statements about divorce and infidelity, as well as all of her 
statements to Ms. Kristal, can have no bearing on Mr. Abdullah's motive where the statements 
and state of mind were not shared with Mr. Abdullah. They were all made in the context of 
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protected, privileged doctor/therapist-patient and lawyer-client relationships, outside the 
presence of Mr. Abdullah and third parties. 
Assuming the district court did not err in concluding these statements were relevant and 
admissible, the court nevertheless abused its discretion in deciding the probative value of these 
statements, except those offered through Velma Seabolt and Gina Wolfe Seybold, was not 
substantially outweighed by "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or 
misleading the jury .... " LR.E. 403; Tr. Vol. VI, p.319, Ls.16-24, p.612, Ls.11-25, p.709, 
Ls.4-12. Notably, the district court did not evaluate Angie's statements to Ms. Seabolt and 
Ms. Wolfe of Mr. Abdullah's past infidelity (in 2000), the condition of her marriage or concerns 
about their relationship and providing for her children, under Idaho Rules of Evidence 403. 
(31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.362, L.25 p.363, L.5; Vol. VH, p.51, L. 15 -- p.52, L.16.) This Court has 
deemed a district court's failure to conduct a 403 analysis when excluding evidence to be error 
requiring a vacation of a judgment of conviction and sentence, absent proof from the State that 
the error is harmless. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469,471 (2010). 
Admission of Angie's privileged and confidential statements to medical/mental health 
providers and her lawyer served no purpose except to assassinate Mr. Abdullah's character, 
inflame the jury against him and lead jurors to convict him for being a bad husband, not because 
the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the charged offenses. Because 
Mr. Abdullah has demonstrated the court erred in admitting these statements over counsels' 
objections, the State must prove the admission of the statements was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, i.e., the statements did not contribute to the verdict. State v. Almaraz, 154 
Idaho 584, 600-01 (2013). The State cannot and has not met its burden. (Resp. Br. 51.) 
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IX. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Statements Made By Mr. Abdullah 
Regarding Practices fn His Country Of Origin That Were Irrelevant And Unfairly Prejudicial 
Mr. Abdullah's responses to his co-worker's queries about the differences between the 
United States and Northern Iraq, particularly with respect to marriage, marriage ceremonies and 
adultery, were wholly irrelevant to any fact of cpnsequence and were substantially more 
prejudicial than probative. The district court abused its discretion in admitting these statements; 
even though the court recognized the matter was one of discretion, it relied on inaccurate facts 
and unreasonable inferences to reach its decision, resulting in a decision outside the bounds of its 
discretion. The district court admitted the statements as reflective of Mr. Abdullah's state of 
mind, based primarily on the prosecutor's proffer. The prosecutor told the court Mr. Adams, a 
co-worker of Mr. Abdullah, would testify that "when asked about can you tell us some of the 
differences between where you are from, the only thing that he mentions is that it 1s permissible 
under circumstances that are shocking to us to kill your wife, and that all you have to do when 
you are the judge of those circumstances is to offer some farthing [sic] to the parents. And that is 
highly relevant. He chose those words. He chose the setting." (31659 Tr. Vol. VII, p.105, L.18 -
p.106, L.9.) 
In admitting the testimony of Mr. Adams and similar testimony from another co-worker, 
Mr. Reagles, the court stated, "it's a close question. And I have to admit, Counsel, I think you're 
right. These are words that he chose, this is what he chose to be the thing that distinguishes 
where he's from and especially, if the words are accurately reflected that "we" so he's still 
associating himself with this country, it's an it is something that is odd for him to pick out in 
the months leading up to the fire and death of Ms. Abdullah." (Id. Tr. Vol. VII, p.106, Ls.12-19.) 
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Mr. Adams testified he, Mr. Abdullah, Mr. Reagles, and some other co-workers were in a 
car on their way to lunch and were discussing cultural differences between Northern Iraq and 
America. (id., p.310, L.21 p.311, L.24.) Mr. Reagles testified Mr. Adams asked Mr. Abdullah 
about differences between the United States and Northern Iraq. (Id. p. l 08, Ls.1-24.) Someone in 
the car brought up the issue of adultery, and Mr. Abdullah indicated that in Northern Iraq, "it was 
an acceptable practice to murder or have your wife murdered if she did commit adultery." (Id. 
p.311, Ls.24-p.312, L.5.) 
Contrary to the district court's conclusion and the State's argument (Resp. Br. 53; 31659 
Tr. Vol. VII, p. l 06, Ls.12-19), this was not the only difference between Northern Iraq and 
American identified by Mr. Abdullah. Rather, general differences between the cultures were 
being discussed when someone else raised the issue of adultery and Mr. Abdullah explained how 
adultery was treated in Notihern Iraq. According to testimony from the State's own witnesses, 
contrary to the State's current protestations, Mr. Abdullah neither expressly nor impliedly 
adopted the Northern Iraqi policy on adultery, or indicated he thought it was a good idea. (31659 
Tr. Vol. VII, p.109, L.12 - p.110, Ll, p.312, L.11 - p.313, L.4; Resp. Br. 53-54.) Moreover, 
even if it was the cultural practice of husbands in Northern Iraq to kill their adulterous wives, in 
order to be relevant to this case, the State would have to present some evidence Mr. Abdullah 
both ascribed to this practice and had a reason to engage in it, i.e., Angie was unfaithful. No 
evidence on either point was presented. The statements were simply irrelevant, and whatever 
scintilla of probative value they may have had was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice 
and misleading the jury. These statements are nothing more than a red herring, meant to direct 
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the jury to harbor unfair prejudice against Mr. Abdullah because of the corner of the world where 
he was born, not because these statements have anything to do with the facts of this case. 
After claiming these statements were somehow an implied or tacit admission by 
Mr. Abdullah that he subscribed to the practices of Northern Iraqis with respect to adulterous 
wives, the State argues the statements were properly admitted because they were "highly relevant 
in establishing intent and premeditation." (Resp. Br. 53-54.) If I was born and raised in Saudi 
Arabia until l was ten years old, and was talking to my coworkers about the differences between 
the treatment of women in the United States and Saudi Arabia, and someone brought up driving, 
and I said "where I am from, women cannot legally drive a car," how could my statement of fact 
be deemed my adoption of Saudi Arabia's policy and practice of prohibiting women from 
driving, or be deemed to be my thoughts and beliefs? lt could not. Similarly, these statements 
were not relevant to Mr. Abdullah's state of mind because they were not statements of his 
thoughts or beliefs. 
After arguing Mr. Abdullah's statements were highly relevant to establish his intent and 
premeditation, the State minimizes their impact, arguing the statements were not relevant. 
Specifically, in arguing Mr. Abdullah was not harmed by admission of these statements, the 
State submits they were "not determinative of any issue or element." (Resp. Br. 54.) To the 
extent the State concedes the statements were not relevant, it is correct. Not only were the 
statements not detenninative of any issue or element, they had absolutely no tendency to make 
the existence of any fact of consequence more probable or less probable than it would have been 
without the statements. The district court abused its discretion in admitting Mr. Abdullah's 
statements through two separate witnesses; it cannot be said, and the State has not proven, that 
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the guilty verdicts in this case were not attributable to these statements. Accordingly, 
Mr. Abdullah's convictions must be vacated and his case remanded for a new trial untainted by 
irrelevant, prejudicial evidence. 
X. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Allow The Jury To Hear Evidence Of 
Angie's Life [nsurance Policy Where Mr. Abdullah Was Not A Beneficiary 
This issue was thoroughly briefed and supported by relevant authority and citations to the 
record in the Appellant's Brief.9 Given the State's Response, however, it must be clarified 
Mr. Abdullah is only challenging the district court's exclusion of evidence of Angie's $500,000 
life insurance policy, to which he was not a beneficiary, and proof that Angie took loans out 
against this policy prior to their marriage. 
The State submitted substantial evidence Mr. Abdullah purchased insurance on the 
vending machines months before the fire, and that he would benefit from the homeowner's 
policy on the Abdullah residence. Mr. Abdullah was prevented from presenting evidence of the 
half-a-million dollar life insurance policy Angie had on herself and her daughter, the most 
9The State argues Mr. Abdullah failed to support this claim by argument and citation authority. 
Mr. Abdullah incorporated the standards from Claim VIII by reference, which include 
admissibility of evidence, the standard of review, and standards applicable to determining 
whether a district court abused its discretion. (Appellant's Br. pp.39-40, 50.) While Mr. Abdullah 
did not cite to any cases addressing the admissibility of life insurance policies in a criminal case 
by a defendant to disprove the state's allegation of financial motive for murder, that is because 
the only cases Mr. Abdullah could locate regarding life insurance policies involve disputes 
among potential beneficiaries or passing references to prosecutors relying on insurance policies 
as proof of motive to kill. See, e.g., Dugmore v. Lattimore, 413 Fed. Appx. 989, 991 (9th Cir. 
2011) (referencing prosecutor's reliance on victim's recently increased life insurance policy as 
proof of defendant's motive to kill him where she was the beneficiary); Banner Life Ins. Co. v. 
lvlark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117 (2009) (remanding for determination of 
whether surviving spouse or deceased husband's trust should receive life insurance policy 
proceeds). 
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valuable of all of the insurance policies, to which he was not a beneficiary. This policy was 
relevant to undermine the State's claim that Mr. Abdullah had a financial motive to kill Angie; 
moreover, evidence regarding the claim would have revealed Angie took out loans against this 
policy long before she married Mr. Abdullah, further contradicting the State's claim that Mr. 
Abdullah had a financial incentive to kill Angie. (Resp. Br. 57.) Mr. Abdullah does not 
challenge the district court's exclusion of Angie's statements on the insurance application itself, 
but continues to object to the district court's refusal to allow him to admit evidence of the 
existence of the life insurance policy, and loans Angie took out against the policy before they 
were married. If Mr. Abdullah's beneficiary status on two insurance policies and the fact that 
Angie took out loans against her life insurance policy during her marriage were relevant to 
motive in the State's case-in-chief, it is unclear how information showing Angie took loans out 
against the same policy before she was married to Mr. Abdullah, and he was not a beneficiary of 
the most valuable insurance policy, can be irrelevant. The information has the "tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,671 (2010) (citing I.R.E. 401). 
Because this information was relevant to rebut the State's evidence and argument that 
Mr. Abdullah had a financial motive to kill Angie and destroy the family's home, the mere 
existence of the insurance policy, its value and the dates loans were taken out against the policy, 
were not outweighed by the risk of confusing the jury and wasting the jury's time. See I.R.E. 
401, 402, 403. The district court erred in deeming the half-million-dollar life insurance was 
irrelevant to Mr. Abdullah's defense, and therefore inadmissible. (31659 Tr. Vol. VII, p.538, 
L.7 - p.539, L.21.) 
29 
XIV. 
The District Court's Finding That There Are No Grounds To Challenge The Legality Of The 
Tenn Of The Grand Jury That Indicted Mr. Abdullah Is Clearly Erroneous And Not Supported 
By The Record 
This claim was thoroughly briefed, argued and supported by citation to the record and 
controlling authority in the Appellant's Brief (See Appellant's Br. 59-61.) The State argues 
Mr. Abdullah did not "raise any error associated with the court's findings" that there is no legal 
basis to challenge the term of the grand jury that indicted him. (Resp. Br. 71-72.) To the contrary, 
Mr. Abdullah maintains the district court's conclusion that no grounds exist to challenge the 
legality of the term of the grand jury that indicted him is clearly erroneous and not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. (Appellant's Br. 59.) 
The record reflects a grand jury was impaneled the morning of August 2002, and 
orders were issued to summon potential grand jurors to appear that same day at 1:30 p.m. (Id. 
pp.60-61.) The record also reflects Mr. Abdullah was indicted by a grand jury on November 14, 
2002; there is nothing in the record showing a connection between the indicting jurors and the 
jurors impaneled the morning of August 28, 2002. (Id.) The State claims because Mr. Abdullah 
did not challenge the formation or jurisdiction of the grand jury, the attack on the district court's 
findings is insufficient to raise a legal challenge. (Resp. Br. 73-74.) Mr. Abdullah asserts, as he 
always has, that there is no evidence to support the conclusion that he was indicted by a legally 
formed grand jury, acting within its terms. (Appellant's Br. 59-61.) 
Accordingly, Mr. Abdullah is entitled to a new trial because the district court's 
conclusion that he was indicted by a legally formed and termed grand jury is erroneous. 
Alternative! y, the district court's findings must be vacated and this Court must either: ( 1) order 
the grand jury selection transcripts be provided under seal for counsels' review and permit 
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supplemental briefing if necessary; or (2) order the district court to provide counsel documents 
showing the grand jury that indicted Mr. Abdullah on November 14, 2002, is the same grand jury 
impaneled at 9:00 a.m. on August 28, 2002. 
POST-CONVICTION ISSUES to 
I. 
The District Court Erred In Applying An Incorrect Standard To The Prejudice Portion Of 
Mr. Abdullah's Claims Ofineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Denying Mr. Abdullah 
Post-Conviction Relief 
The State concedes the district court incorrectly stated the standard for assessing the 
prejudice prong of the two-part ineffective assistance of counsel standard established in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ( I 984). (Resp. Br. 120-21.) Under Strickland, a petitioner 
need only show there is a reasonable probability that but for his counsels' unprofessional errors, 
the results of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 694. The reasonable 
probability standard is a lower burden than a preponderance of the evidence, requiring a showing 
only that counsels' errors have rendered the result of the proceeding unreliable, not that counsels' 
errors more likely than not altered the outcome. Id at 693-94. Nevertheless, the State maintains 
the district court evaluated Mr. Abdullah's claims applying the proper standard and argues 
Mr. Abdullah simply found two "snippets" where the court erroneously stated the burden for 
showing prejudice. (Resp. Br. 121.) What the State fails to recognize is that these "snippets" 
citing the erroneous standard for showing prejudice are contained in the section where the district 
court sets forth the standards it applied to all of Mr. Abdullah's Final Petition claims alleging 
10Mr. Abdullah relies upon his Appellant's Brief and will not reply to the State's Response to 
each of his post-conviction claims, unless an additional response is warranted. 
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"actual ineffective assistance of counsel" under Strickland. (R.39417, pp.8353-55.) In addition, a 
review of the district court's findings and conclusions for each ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim reveals the district court actually applied the wrong standard, distinguishing this case from 
Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 654-55 (2004) (holding despite the lower court's erroneous 
statement that the petitioner had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsels' 
errors altered the outcome, the court actually applied the correct reasonable probability standard). 
In Holland, the lower court stated it was applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to the 
prejudice prong of the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance, when in fact, it had applied the 
less demanding reasonable probability standard. 542 U.S. at 654-55. Here, in contrast, the district 
court not only identified the wrong standard, but applied the wrong standard to Mr. Abdullah' 
claims. (Appellant's Br. 92-191.) Specifically, the district court required Mr. Abdullah to prove 
his counsels' deficient performance "more likely than not" altered the outcome of his case. (Id.) 
Accordingly, it is clear the district court did not know and did not apply the correct standard to its 
evaluation of Mr. Abdullah's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The State also argues the district court did not reject the ABA Guidelines for determining 
the reasonableness of counsels' representation, but simply recognized the Guidelines were one 
factor, among many, to be weighed by the court. (Resp. Br. 122.) To the contrary, the district 
court took issue with Mr. Abdullah relying upon the ABA Guidelines for the prevailing 
professional practice at the time of his trial. (R. 39417, p.8434.) While the State and the district 
court may oppose rigid application of the ABA Guidelines to determine the reasonableness of 
counsels' performance, that is not how Mr. Abdullah asked the court to apply the ABA 
Guidelines. Simply put, Mr. Abdullah asked the district court to consider the ABA Guidelines 
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in the same way both the United States Supreme Court and this Court1 1 have: as the prevailing 
professional norms of practice which serve as a starting point for evaluating the reasonableness 
of counsels' performance. (Appellant's Br. 163-65.) In sum, Mr. Abdullah asked the district 
comt to rely upon the ABA Guidelines to guide its assessment of whether counsels' performance 
was reasonable according to prevailing professional norms of practice. 
The district court rejected Mr. Abdullah's request, and rejected the ABA Guidelines as 
establishing the prevailing professional norms of practice at the time of his trial. ft is unclear 
what standards, if any, the district court relied on for determining the prevailing professional 
norms of practice, and equally unclear which standards the district comi applied to assess the 
reasonableness of counsels' performance. 
Because the district court rejected well-established standards set forth in the ABA 
Guidelines in favor of unstated, unknown standards to determine whether counsels' performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and applied an erroneous standard to judge 
whether Mr. Abdullah was prejudiced by his counsels' deficiencies, the district court's order 
dismissing Mr. Abdullah's ineffective assistance of claims should be vacated and his case 
remanded for reconsideration of his claims applying appropriate, identified standards. 
11 As it does in every case involving the ABA Guidelines, the State argues this Court refused to 
adopt the ABA guidelines in State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 782 (1997). The argument is 
phrased in a way that leads the reader to conclude this Court rejected the ABA Guidelines in 
their entirety. In fact, this Court rejected the defendant's request that this Court require two 
attorneys be appointed to represent a defendant in capital cases, as was required by the ABA 
Guidelines, but not Idaho law. Id. This Court did not reject the ABA Guidelines wholesale. 
Moreover, just a few years after Porter, this Court adopted the two attorney requirement in 
capital cases. See Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3(2)(a)(l). 
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VII. 
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Abdullah's Claim That He Was 
Denied His Sixth Amendment Right To Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Counsels' Failure 
To Investigate, Prepare And Present An Adequate Case In Mitigation 
Mr. Abdullah maintains his trial counsels' mitigation investigation was nominal, and the 
quality and depth of available mitigation evidence presented to his jury was wholly inadequate. 
Counsels' failures with respect to the investigation, preparation and presentation of a mitigation 
case on Mr. Abdullah's behalf were unreasonable, falling well below any standard of 
professional norms, regardless of which standards are applied. There is a reasonable probability 
that but for counsels' errors and omissions at sentencing, Mr. Abdullah would have been able to 
convince at least one juror that a death sentence would be unjust. Trial counsels' failures at 
sentencing render the death verdict wholly unreliable and undermine any confidence in the 
outcome. 
The State argues that it has only been through "years of additional investigation and 
exhaustive state resources" that the SAPD has been able to "unearth" additional mitigation about 
Mr. Abdullah. (Resp. Br. 132.) As the State is well aware, the SAPD budget is set by the State 
legislature, and during the time the SAPD has represented Mr. Abdullah, the recession forced 
significant personnel and operating cuts to the SAPD budget, including unpaid staff furloughs. 
(R. 39417, pp.6451-63.) It is absurd for the State to argue the mitigation in Mr. Abdullah's was 
only discovered because the SAPD was able to expend unlimited state resources to investigate 
his background, when in fact, the mitigation presented to the district court in post-conviction was 
always at trial counsels' fingertips, had they bothered to look or ask. 
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this Court has recognized: 
Presentation of some mitigating evidence, even if strong, is insufficient if 
other mitigating evidence is available upon reasonable investigation. Rompilla v. 
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387--93, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-69, 162 L.Ed.2d 360, 375-79 
(2005). However, no relief is mandated where counsel's investigation is not as 
thorough as it could have been because the courts "address not what is prudent or 
appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled." Burger v. Kemp, 483 
U.S. 776, 794, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3126, 97 L.Ed.2d 638, 657 (1987). 
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 388 (2013). Mr. Abdullah does not claim that trial counsels' 
investigation and presentation were "not as thorough as [they] could have been," but maintains 
their investigation and presentation of evidence in mitigation barely scratched the surface. 
In defense of the mitigation case, the State cites Kim's penalty phase opening statement 
to show counsel had a mitigation theme, 12 even if they did not present it. (Resp. Br. 138.) The 
State then argues counsels' presentation of an hour and a half of testimony from Mr. Abdullah's 
family members, most of which required the assistance of an interpreter, was sufficient, and any 
more would have been cumulative. (Resp. Br. 137-42.) The State seems to expend more time and 
energy summarizing the four family members' testimony than counsel took to elicit it. In sum, 
the State's position appears to be that in the context of mitigation and mitigating evidence, less is 
more. 
That would be like saying "Seymour Glass committed suicide" is the same as saying 
[Seymour Glass] got off at the fifth floor, walked down the hall, and let 
himself into 507. The room smelled of new calfskin luggage and nail-lacquer 
remover. 
He glanced at the girl lying asleep on one of the twin beds. Then he went 
over to one of the pieces of luggage, opened it, and from under a pile of shorts 
and undershirts he took out an Ortgies caliber 7.65 automatic. He released the 
12Of course, statements of counsel are not evidence and cannot be relied upon as such. State v. 
Fondren, 24 Idaho 663 n.4 (1913). 
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magazine, looked at it, then reinserted it. He cocked the piece. Then he went over 
and sat down on the unoccupied bed, looked at the girl, aimed the pistol, and fired 
a bullet through his right temple. 
J.D. SALINGER, A Pe1fect Day for Bananafish in NINE STORIES 18 (Bantam Books, October 
1964) (1953). Applying the State's logic, the latter description is simply cumulative of the 
former four word statement, and far less compelling. 
The logic of this argument leads the State to equate Dr. Gunter's descriptions of the 
conditions at the refugee camps where Mr. Abdullah and his family languished for years as 
"marginal" or "submarginal," with Haji's vivid description of just one of the camps: 
The living conditions in Silopi were horrible. There were open pits of 
human waste and the stench was horrible. They were withholding food, tea, and 
sugar from us. When we protested the food and living conditions, Turkish soldiers 
killed one of our neighbors and mjured several others. Azad witnessed these acts 
of violence, and he was very frightened. 
(R. 39417, p.4966.) Rahan's description of Camp Mardin, the refugee camp where the Abdullah 
family lived for over four years before coming to America, would similarly be cumulative of 
testimony that the conditions in the camps were "marginal" or "submarginal." 
We lived in our tent in Mardin for over four years, while Azad was 
approximately eleven to fifteen years old. We had inadequate water and food, 
especially at the beginning. Water was always a problem. Sometimes the guards 
would shut off the water, and we had to carry it from neighboring villages .... 
Toilets at Mardin were open pits and trenches. Our tent was very close to the open 
pit. Flies, death, and disease were everywhere, especially in the afternoons and 
evenings. Sometimes the human waste came into our tent, and children were 
urinating on the side of our tent. Sometime people fell into the open pit toilets and 
died or became very ill. I believe over four hundred people died at the camp. 
(R. 39417, p.4758.) Clearly, Dr. Gunter's descriptions of the conditions at the camps as 
"marginal" or "submarginal" are accurate, albeit understated; nevertheless, the words marginal 
and submarginal do nothing to convey the actual conditions Mr. Abdullah and his family were 
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subjected to, each and every day, for numerous years during his adolescent development. The 
State's argument that brief, pithy descriptions are the functional equivalent of vivid, compelling, 
and detailed testimony providing jurors with first-hand accounts of the extraordinarily difficult 
circumstances and situations Mr. Abdullah and his family faced before coming to America, and 
the difficulties they overcame to assimilate into American culture, is simply absurd. 
In response to the undisputed evidence of counsels' inadequate preparation for penalty 
phase testimony and witnesses, the State argues counsel failed to prepare mitigation witnesses to 
testify "because of their desire to have spontaneity, which can arguably result in greater emotion 
before the jury since the witnesses were not aware of the exact subject matter of their testimony." 
(Resp. Br. 142.) Aside from being outrageous, this speculation, if adopted, would excuse 
counsels' failure to prepare for every aspect of trial, guilt and penalty phase alike, because 
preparation might lead to knowledge of what a witness 1s going to say or what evidence is going 
to be offered. In fact, it would not only excuse such a tactic, but would encourage it. According 
to the State, such knowledge and preparation would put counsel at a disadvantage by removing 
the emotion and spontaneity from trials, which the State apparently believes should be slapped 
together at the last minute and unfold organically in the courtroom. 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned the approach advocated by 
the State. As the Court has long acknowledged, strategic decisions made without the benefit of 
adequate investigation are unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (holding 
Court's focus is on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision was itself was 
reasonable). "The relevant question is not whether counsels' choices were strategic, but whether 
they were reasonable." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000) (citation omitted). 
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Counsels' mitigation investigation was inadequate, and their preparation for the mitigation case 
was virtually non-existent; no strategy could justify the mitigation case presented by trial counsel 
in this case, and counsels' choices cannot be deemed reasonable under these circumstances. 
The State also argues because Kim was admonished by the court to keep her emotions 
under control during her examination of witnesses, that shows counsel presented a compelling 
story of Mr. Abdullah's tragic childhood to the jury, and presumably this presentation had an 
emotional impact on Kim, which she could not hide from jurors, the State or the district court. 
(Resp. Br. 141-42; 31659 Tr. Vol. VIII, p.341, Ls.7-10.) After Kim finished eliciting a few 
minutes of largely unemotional testimony from Abdullah family friend, Jim Rogers, and once the 
Jury was excused, the prosecutor stated: "I have concerns about counsel's composure when she's 
asking questions, Judge. I think it is an unfair communication to the jury. I would like to have 
that addressed." (31659 Tr. Vol. VIII, p.341, Ls.3-6.) The distnct court responded, "Counsel, I 
share this concern. I understand this is an emotional experience and this has kind of been an 
ongoing issue before. So l just really want to admonish you that you need to keep your emotions 
under control." (Id., p.341, Ls.7-10 (emphasis added).) Clearly, Kim's inability to keep her 
emotions under control had no correlation to the testimony she was eliciting or the procedural 
posture of the case; she just had difficulties keeping her emotions under control throughout the 
proceedings generally. Notably, Kim had no involvement in eliciting what should have been the 
most emotionally-laden testimony from Mr. Abdullah's family members; Mitch handled that 
questioning without emotion. (31659 Tr. Vol. VIII, pp.280-94 (Haji), pp.294-315 (Dilshad), 
pp.316-326 (Nichivan), pp.35-52, 355-58, 374-78 (Rahan).) 
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Finally, to explain counsels' failure to present a compelling mitigation case despite 
counsels' access to numerous mitigation witnesses, the State speculates trial counsel made 
strategic choices about which family members should testify. Trial counsel never said they did 
so, but the State argues we should assume they did. Essentially, the State's argument is that by 
limiting the number of humanizing witnesses who testified on Mr. Abdullah's behalt~ counsel 
were trying to prevent the dilution of the "compelling" hour and a half of family testimony by 
not offering the same "general testimony" from other witnesses. (Resp. Br. 142-43.) Again, 
counsels' failure to present a compelling mitigation case was simply unreasonable and 
unexplained. 
Predictably, both the district court below and the State on appeal argue that because of 
"the exceptionally heinous nature of the crimes for which he has been convicted, Abdullah has 
not established a reasonable probability of a different result even if the additional evidence had 
been presented." (Resp. Br. 144; R. 39417, pp.8511-12 ("That his family of origin loves him 
pales in comparison to the facts of the case.").) In its Response, the State argues Mr. Abdullah's 
crimes are "exceptionally heinous" and no amount of mitigating evidence would or could have 
resulted in a sentence other than death. (See also Resp. Br. 148 ("[V]irtually no amount of 
mitigation was going to overcome the aggravation stemming from the brutal acts Abdullah 
perpetrated against his wife and young children .... ").) Courts have addressed similar "brutality 
trumps" arguments in related contexts, observing: 
Likewise, the State's stereotypical fall-back argument-that the heinous and 
egregious nature of the crime would have ensured assessment of the death penalty 
even absent the psychiatric testimony about future dangerousness-cannot carry the 
day here. First, that argument cannot prevail without eviscerating the Supreme 
Court-approved Texas "special issues" scheme. To permit a jury to impose the 
death sentence solely because the facts are heinous and egregious would be to 
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return to the days of inflicting capital punishment based on emotion and revenge, 
supplanting altogether the questions of deliberateness and future dangerousness 
which make the Texas scheme constitutional. Second, in this particular case, the 
details of the crime, as horrific as they are on an absolute scale, are not 
significantly more egregious than those in, for example, Vanderbilt. Except for 
there being a second teenage victim here (who survived), the crimes are 
amazingly parallel; yet the equally heinous facts in Vanderbilt were insufficient to 
negate prejudice. Finally, our decades of experience with scores of§ 2254 habeas 
cases from the death row of Texas teach an obvious lesson that is frequently 
overlooked: Almost without exception, the cases we see in which conviction of 
a capital crime has produced a death sentence arise from extremely 
egregious, heinous, and shocking facts. But, if that were all that is required to 
offset prejudicial legal error and convert it to harmless error, habeas relief 
based on evidentiary error in the punishment phase would virtually never be 
available, so testing for it would amount to a hollow judicial act. 
Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 1, 563 (5th Cir. 200 l) (footnote omitted) ( emphasis added) 
(rejecting brutality trumps argument in Fifth Amendment context); see also Walbey v. 
Quarterman, 309 Fed.Appx. 795, 804 (5 th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per curiam) (rejecting 
brutality trumps argument in context of Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, observing "Texas must do more than baldly point out the obvious, that Walbey's crime 
was extremely brutal"). 13 
No death sentence is inevitable. Every first degree murder is death-eligible in Idaho, even 
if not sought. I.C. § 18-4003. Many murders where death was not imposed involved facts more 
egregious, and offenders far more culpable than Mr. Abdullah. See, e.g., Patrick Orr, Idaho 
prosecutors opting not to seek death penalty, IDAHO STATESMAN, November 3, 2009 (identifying 
Ada and Elmore County cases where death was not sought and those in Ada County and Canyon 
County where the State sought death but jury did not impose it, even when cases involved child 
13Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 32.l(a)(i)-(ii), unpublished cases issued 
after January 1, 2007, are citable. 
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homicide victims); Edgar Linares, Man who Killed Nampa Couple in 2003 Life in Prison, 
KTVB.com, March 20, 2010 (defendant who tied up an elderly couple in their home, stabbed 
and tortured them, and then left them to die on Christmas Day in 2003, given two life sentences 
without the possibility of parole)( available at http://www.ktvb.com/news/Roberts-gets-life-in-
prison-for-killing-Nampa-couple-88564022.html); Brian Rogers and Dale Lezon, Jurors 
Sentence HPD Officer's Killer To Life, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 20, 2008 Qury imposing life 
sentence rather than death upon defendant who was illegally in the country and who shot and 
killed beloved Houston police officer repeatedly in the back and head); Ian Ith, "Emissary Of 
Death" Sentenced To Life, SEATTLE TIMES, December 19, 2003 (reporting court's imposition of 
48 consecutive life sentences upon Gary Ridgway following his guilty pleas to 48 counts of 
aggravated murder); David Kocieniewski, Death On The Night Shift: The Plea; Ee-Nurse Pleads 
Guilty To Killing Patients, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 2004 (reporting defendant's guilty pleas to 
intentionally killing fourteen patients, and admission to killing as many as forty-patients, with 
the court imposing thirteen life sentences); 1Vloussaoui Formally Sentenced, Still Defiant, NBC 
NEWS, May 4, 2006 (after guilty pleas to conspiring to kill thousands of Americans as part of the 
September 11 th attacks, a federal jury decided not to impose death on the "20th 
hijacker")(available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/126l5601 #.UgHHf6yleHc). Simply put, 
there is no such thing as an automatic death penalty, and no crime or facts are so egregious or 
heinous or horrific that the death penalty is inevitable. Accordingly, the perceived brutality or 
egregious nature of a particular crime is never an excuse for counsel to fail to do their job to 
present a readily-available mitigation case, and is no basis for a court to deem the presentation of 
a slip-shod mitigation case adequate or effective. 
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xm. 
The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Abdullah's Claim That He Was Denied His 
Sixth Amendment Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Counsels' Improper 
Advisements Regarding His Right To Testify At The Guilt And Penalty Phase, And To Allocute 
Mr. Abdullah thoroughly explained the standards governing a defendant's constitutional 
right to testify and allocute in a capital case, and cited relevant portions of the record in support 
of this claim. (Appellant's Br. 156-71.) Mr. Abdullah takes this opportunity to provide a limited 
response to inaccuracies in the State's Response. 
Incredibly, the State claims Mr. Abdullah's arguments ignore ethical mies and the Idaho 
Court of Appeals' "implicit" adoption of narrative testimony in State v. Waggoner, 124 Idaho 
716 (Ct.App.1993). (Resp. Br. 178 n.39.) Contrary to the State's claim, Mr. Abdullah 
specifically cited to and discussed the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Waggoner and 
explained why Waggoner is of limited value under the facts and circumstances of 
Mr. Abdullah' s case. (See and compare Appellant's Br. 159 ( citing Waggoner and explaining its 
limited utility) with Resp. Br. 178 n.39 ("Incredibly, Abdullah does not even mention Waggoner, 
let alone attempt to distinguish the court of appeals' decision.").) 
Moreover, the State fails to acknowledge the limited value of decisions from the Idaho 
Court of Appeals in capital cases. Generally speaking, this Court has held that "[a]lthough 
persuasive, Court of Appeal's decisions are not binding case law precedent in this Court." State 
v. Morton, 140 Idaho 235, 238 (2004) (citing Dachlet v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 757 (2002)). 
Nowhere is this principle more strong than in capital cases, where the Idaho Supreme Court is 
the only court vested with the authority to decide cases on appeal involving a death sentence. 
See I.C. § 1-2406(1) (vesting jurisdiction over appeals from imposition of death sentences in the 
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Idaho Supreme Court); LC. § 19-2827 (requiring mandatory review of death sentences by Idaho 
Supreme Court and setting forth issues Idaho Supreme Court must review in capital cases). 
For the reasons explained in his Appellant's Briet: trial counsels' coercive tactics and 
erroneous advice deprived Mr. Abdullah of his right to effective assistance of counsel and his 
constitutional right to testify and allocute. These constitutional violations, coupled with the 
district court's application of a preponderance of the evidence standard to the prejudice prong of 
Mr. Abdullah's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, entitle Mr. Abdullah to either a new 
trial, or a remand for reconsideration of this claim applying correct standards. 
XIV. 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Abdullah 's Claim That His Sixth Amendment 
Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel Was Violated By Counsels' Failure To Conduct 
Adequate Voir Dire, Failure To Strike Biased Jurors For Cause And Failing To Utilize 
Peremptory Strikes To Remove The Most Biased Jurors 
The State clearly misunderstands Mr. Abdullah argument. The State claims Mr. Abdullah 
is arguing his trial counsel were ineffective "because they failed to properly utilize the 'Colorado 
Method' of selecting a jury .... " (Resp. Br. 183.) Mr. Abdullah is not arguing counsels' failure 
to follow the Colorado Method itself was per se deficient. As Mr. Abdullah made extraordinarily 
clear to the district court, and in his Appellant's brief, his trial counsel were ineffective for 
failing to conduct adequate voir dire, failing to strike biased jurors for cause, and failing to utilize 
peremptory strikes to remove the most biased jurors. Counsels' actions and inactions in voir dire 
were deficient because they are contrary to the well-established standards the United States 
Supreme Court has adopted for selecting death-qualified jurors, not because they are contrary to 
the Colorado Method. (Appellant's Br. 171-90.) 
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In an interesting twist, the State then because the Colorado Method is only 
concerned with sentencing, trial counsel correctly chose a Jury outside the strictures of the 
Colorado Method because counsel were rightly interested in obtaining not guilty verdicts. (Resp. 
Br. 185.) Of course, this is contrary to the State's prior assertion that trial counsel had no choice 
but to concede Mr. Abdullah's presence at the scene, standing in front of his burning house with 
his children inside, because the evidence of his presence in Boise was overwhelming. (Resp. Br. 
168-70 ("Based upon the overwhelming nature of the state's case, Toryanskis had virtually no 
other option [than concede Mr. Abdullah was in Boise at the Siesta residence at the time of the 
fire].").) The State cannot, in good conscience, argue it was reasonably strategic to forego the 
Colorado Method in hopes of obtaining a jury that would be friendly to a guilt-phase defense that 
the State asserts had no hope to begin with. 
For all of the reasons set forth in Mr. Abdullah's Appellant's Brief~ his trial counsels' 
performance during voir dire and jury selection was deficient, and he was prejudiced as a result 
because a biased, partial jury deliberated, found him guilty, and agreed the death penalty was not 
an unjust punishment. (Appellant's Br. 171-90.) The district court's conclusions to the contrary 
are erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons identified in Mr. Abdullah's Appellant's Brief and herein, Mr. Abdullah 
was deprived of his right to a fair trial free of constitutional error before a fair and impartial jury. 
As a result, his convictions for first degree murder, arson, three counts of attempted first degree, 
and felony injury to a child must be vacated and his case remanded for a new trial. 
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Alternatively, the district court's decision applying incorrect standards to Mr. Abdullah's 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and summarily dismissing a majority of his post-
conviction claims, must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings applying 
proper standards. 
DATED this 26th day of March, 2014. 
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